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Détection de l'effet de sélection-adverse dans un modèle de prévision des 
faillites bancaires en Europe 
Résumé 
Nous estimons un indicateur avancé des faillites bancaires sur un panel de 82 banques 
européennes observées entre 1991 et 2005. Le papier propose deux contributions 
originales. Tout d’abord, nous construisons un indicateur de distance au défaut dérivé 
de la théorie des options (Merton) et nous évaluons son pouvoir prédictif. Les tests 
réalisés ici sont très similaires à ceux de Gropp, Vesala et Vulpes (2005), mais notre 
période d’étude est plus longue de quatre années et nous utilisons une définition plus 
restrictive de la faillite bancaire. Cette première partie du papier montre la robustesse 
de nos données et confirme la qualité de la distance au défaut comme indicateur avancé 
des faillites bancaires européennes. Notre seconde avancée réside dans l’introduction 
d’une variable de détection des problèmes de sélection adverse qui peuvent résulter de 
stratégies de croissance trop rapides. Nous montrons qu’une mesure de la croissance 
moyenne passée des actifs est un prédicteur significatif et puissant des difficultés 
bancaires à venir. Nous discutons l’origine et les conséquences de cet effet. 
 
Mots-clés : faillites bancaires ; early warning systems ; ratios CAMELS; distance au 
défaut 
 
An Early Warning Model for EU banks with Detection of the Adverse Selection 
Effect 
Abstract 
We estimate an early warning model of banks’ failure using a panel of 82 EU banks 
observed between 1991 and 2005. We make two contributions to the literature. Firstly, 
we construct a distance-to-default indicator and test its predictive power. The tests 
implemented here are very similar to those realized by Gropp, Vesala and 
Vulpes  (2005), but our time dimension is four years longer and we use a more 
restrictive definition of banks’ “failure”. This first part of the paper establishes the 
accuracy of our data and confirms the robustness of distance-to-default as an early 
indicator of EU banks’ fragility. Our second advance consists in introducing a variable 
detecting the adverse selection problem that can be caused by rapid growth strategies. 
A measure of past average growth of assets is shown to be a very significant and 
powerful predictor of future banks’ difficulties. We discuss the origins and implications 
of such an effect. 
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1. Introduction  
Early detection of bank difficulties is an important matter of concern for bank 
regulators. Indeed, it is probably the best way to avoid contagion by implementing prompt 
corrective actions before the propagation of liquidity or solvability problems. Thought in-site 
monitoring is probably the best way to gather valuable information -both quantitative and 
qualitative- about a bank’s financial health, it is also a rather costly approach and it may be 
sometimes plagued by perception biases. That is why statistical Early Warning Models are 
widely considered as valuable complementary tools to provide efficient off-site detection 
means.  
Until the early nineties, these statistical models mainly used balance-sheet and income-
statement indicators, sometimes completed by macroeconomic variables. But the evolution of 
the banking industry has greatly increased the share of market-priced assets and liabilities in 
banks’ balance-sheets. Nowadays, banks are not only under the scrutiny of public supervisors: 
they are also submitted to the market discipline of some of their creditors. These changes have 
promoted the use of market variables in Early Warning Models of banks’ fragility. There is 
now a host of empirical papers focused on the US which show that market indicators provide 
very useful forward-looking information to predict banks’ difficulties. Some similar studies 
also exist for EU banks, but they are more recent and less numerous. In particular, Gropp, 
Vesala and Vulpes (2005) have shown that a distance-to-default
1 computed on the basis of a 
Merton-inspired credit risk model appears to be a very efficient indicator since it is both 
complete and unbiased
2. 
Nevertheless, as it has been recently suggested by King, Nuxoll and Yeager (2005), 
introducing market indicators is only a first step towards Early Warning Models that would be 
fully adapted to the new banking environment. In fact, this new environment also advocates 
for the introduction of more risk-focused and growth-focused indicators. Risk-focused 
approaches are warranted by the spread of asset-liability management strategies which 
increase the interest rate sensitivity of banks’ earnings. They are also justified by the 
permanent importance of real-estate as a cause of bank failure. Growth-monitoring indicators 
are based on the idea that risky growth strategies generate adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems which can lead to failure if they are not detected early enough. As a consequence, 
indicators of a too fast growth of assets or loans, as well as variables capturing the attempt to 
switch towards non-core and non-market-priced funding, may have a significant impact on 
the probability on banks’ failure. 
In this paper, we make two contributions to the empirical literature, using a panel 
dataset on 82 EU banks observed between 1991 and 2005.  
Firstly, we construct a distance-to-default indicator and test its predictive power for 
banks‘ failure. The tests implemented for this part of the paper are very similar to the one 
conducted by Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2005), but our time dimension is four years longer 
and we use a more restrictive definition of banks’ “failure”. This first part of the paper allows 
                                                 
1 DD in the sequel. 
2 According to Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2005), an indicator of banks’ fragility is said to be complete if it 
reflects the three major determinants of default risk (Market value of assets; leverage; volatility of assets). It is 
unbiased if it is decreasing in the value of assets and increasing in their volatility and with leverage. An Early Warning Model for EU banks with Detection of the Adverse Selection Effect 
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us to show the accuracy of our data and especially of the distance-to-default indicator. It 
corroborates the results already obtained by Grop, Vesala and Vulpes.  
Our second advance consists in introducing a variable detecting the adverse selection 
effect of rapid growth strategies. A measure of past average growth of assets is shown to be 
very significant and powerful as a predictor of future banks’ difficulties. We discuss the 
origins and implications of such an effect. 
The paper is organized as follows: in section II we recall the foundations of traditional 
Early Warning Systems and we discuss the introduction of new variables such as market 
indicators or growth-focused and risk-focused measures. Section III surveys the most 
important empirical results of previous estimates of banks’ default probabilities. In section IV 
we describe our database and we explain the building of our dependent and independent 
variables. Our empirical results are discussed in section V and section VI concludes the paper. 
2. Foundations of Early Warning Systems (EWS) 
2.1. CAMELS indicators 
An extensive literature has been devoted to the supervision of banking system in the 
US, and more recently in the EU. Most studies use bank-level data to explain why financial 
institutions either fail or survive.  
Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968) first used Discriminant Analysis as well as different 
specifications of  the so-called Z-score in order to distinguish between fragile and sound 
banks. The lower the Z-score, the more likely the company is to fail. More recent studies use 
Probit or Logit models to estimate the determinants of failure, but the fundamental technique 
has remained the same. Its objective is to identify a common set of variables, essentially 
financial ratios, that differ in a systematic way between failed and non-failed banks. To this 
extent, these first models of bank failure are based on a historical analysis ("backward-looking 
models"). 
The most significant improvement in that field was provided in the seventies by the 
American banking supervisors (the FDIC and the Federal Reserve) which formalized the 
CAMELS system. This global rating is attributed after an on-site visit and is based on 6 
criteria: Capital, Assets quality, Management quality, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity to 
market risks. Although the on-site visits are very useful to the whole notation system, the 
rating may become obsolete quite rapidly. Cole and Gunther (1998) show for example that a 
very simple model based on financial ratios (an "off-site examination model") performs better 
than a one year old CAMELS rating in predicting a failure.  
The crucial point is to detect banks whose financial condition has substantially 
deteriorated since the last examination and to monitor institutions between two examinations. 
These Early Warning Systems (EWS) use as inputs the financial ratios from the banks’ FDIC 
Call Reports and they forecast future ratings or alternatively, they aim at detecting 
deficiencies that are severe enough to cause an imminent failure or a critical shortfall in 
capital. The most popular are the SCOR (Statistical CAMELS Offsite Rating) implemented 
by the FDIC in 1998 and the SEER (System to Estimate Examination Ratings) adopted by the 
Fed in 1993. An Early Warning Model for EU banks with Detection of the Adverse Selection Effect 
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2.2. Dynamic models with forward-looking variables 
King, Nuxoll and Yeager (2005) argue that regulatory changes, financial and 
technological innovations have recently changed the banking environment and the causes of 
financial distress both in Europe and in the United States. Many banks have expanded into 
investment banking, insurance or other financial services, and an increasing fraction of their 
profits derives from fee income generated by these operations.  
More generally, globalization, competitive environment and financial developments 
have impacted bank’ management. Bankers are now closer to investors by the way they think 
in terms of portfolio optimisation to manage their activities. 
The banking industry has changed, so has the path to distress. As King, Nuxoll and 
Yeager (2005) suggested, the prevailing EWS face two main criticisms: they are not well 
suited to the risk-focused approach of bank supervision and they are backward-looking. These 
current models primarily focus on credit risk and earnings. They do not include, for instance, 
interest rate risk, operational risk and they superficially analyse liquidity risk. New models are 
therefore developed by the regulators to account for the new, more risk-focused framework: a 
good example is given by the Real Estate Stress Test (REST)
3 which incorporates the 
experience of the New England real estate crisis of the early nineties. The Economic Value 
Model (EVE)
4 focuses on interest rate risk by calculating a duration model of the balance 
sheet. In both cases, such models need to be implemented with highly detailed accounting 
data. That is one reason why we won’t be able to propose such an approach in the present 
study. 
Nevertheless, as suggested by King, Nuxoll and Yeager  (2005), another way to adjust 
previous models to the rapid change and growing complexity of the banking industry is to 
adopt a more forward-looking approach. Two directions are then worthwhile.  
The first one, following Merton’s theory, suggests that shareholders estimate an implicit 
default probability of the firm. In this view, EWS models can be completed with stock market 
data. In particular, a distance-to-default indicator derived from standard option-pricing theory 
can be calculated and integrated in econometric estimates of banks’ probability of failure. 
This methodology has been successfully implemented by Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2005) 
who have demonstrated the high predictive power of such an indicator for EU banks. We will 
use a very similar methodology to introduce a distance-to-default indicator in our Early 
Warning Model. 
A second direction consists in building some indicators to capture the adverse selection 
problems which might appear when banks are undertaking aggressive growth strategies. 
Indeed, these strategies might conduct them to adopt lower standards in the selection and 
monitoring of their new assets. This could then lead to a rise in their level of risk and generate 
solvability problems whenever these assets would appear to be of bad quality some months 
latter. As a consequence, King, Nuxoll and Yeager (2005) suggest that a rapid growth of 
assets, loans or non-core-market-priced funding can lead to higher estimated default 
                                                 
3 See Collier, Forbush and Nuxoll (2003), « The vulnerability of banks and thrifts to a real estate crisis. », FDIC 
Banking review. 
4 See Embersit and Haupt (1991), « A method for evaluating interest rate risk in U.S. commercial banks », 
Federal Reserve Bulletin (august 1991). An Early Warning Model for EU banks with Detection of the Adverse Selection Effect 
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probabilities. These kinds of effects are present for example in the FDIC’s Growth 
Monitoring System (GMS), but we still lack evidence of the significance of such variables for 
EU banks. We will provide first-step estimates showing that an adverse selection detection 
variable might provide useful additional information in Early Warning Models for EU banks. 
3. The usefulness of market-based indicators: recent 
evidence from the literature 
As mentioned previously, market-based measures of banks' risks have several 
advantages. They may summarise information that cannot be extracted from other sources, 
they are intrinsically forward-looking and besides, they are available at a very high frequency. 
Recent empirical studies show that market prices (Stocks and Subordinated Bonds in 
particular) can be helpful in forecasting bank distress, both in the US and in Europe. To our 
knowledge, Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2005) and Distinguin, Rous, Tarazi (2005) are the 
first authors to clearly address the issue of an EWS for EU banks based on securities data. 
In this paper, we focus on the use of stock market data to forecast financial difficulties 
of the banks. Nevertheless, other sources of information have proved to be useful and several 
authors have been studying the properties of Subordinated Debt Spreads as predictors of bank 
failure
5. They argue that this indicator may be the most appropriate because it reflects the true 
banks' risks. To this extent, Subordinated Debt issuance has been often recommended as a 
discipline instrument. Indeed, the fact that subordinated debt-holders are uninsured gives 
them strong incentives to react to deteriorations in the bank's financial situation.  
However, the Subordinated Debt indicator also has some major drawbacks. First, it is 
not straightforward to compute since one has to rely on a few conventions to decide what type 
of data to collect (the banks usually issue several bonds with different profile and time-to-
maturity) and to choose the risk-free rate used as a reference for the calculation of the spreads. 
Second, the liquidity of these bonds can often be questioned.  
Since we aimed at designing a flexible, operational EWS, we chose to use only stock 
prices and therefore, we closely followed the applications of Merton's model to derive a 
distance-to-default indicator. As described in Appendix B, this variable represents the number 
of standard deviations that separate the firm from its default point, measured in terms of the 
assets' volatility. This indicator seems to provide additional information relative to traditional 
financial ratios (see, among other studies applied to the US banking system, Gunther, 
Levonian and Moore (2001), Krainer and Lopez (2003), Curry, Elmer and Fissel (2004)).  
Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2005) argue that a good market indicator should be 
decreasing in earnings, and increasing in earnings volatility and leverage ratio, that is 
complete (it is sensible to these three factors) and unbiased (it reacts in the expected way). 
Within this theoretical framework, the authors show that the distance-to-default indicator has 
predictive power for bank fragility since it helps to forecast a "failure" up to 18 months before 
the event, even when they control for the safety net effect. Moreover, the authors include in 
their models a synthetic measure of the financial situation of the bank (a score based on 
accounting data) and they show that the distance-to-default provides additional information 
                                                 
5 Evanoff and Wall (2000) in the US, Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2005) in the EU, among others, have shown 
that the Subordinated Debt Spreads have leading properties over traditional indicators used by the regulator. An Early Warning Model for EU banks with Detection of the Adverse Selection Effect 
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relative to accounting information. Finally, they report good statistics of Type I errors: a weak 
bank is classified as sound in less than 30% of the cases. 
Distinguin, Rous, Tarazi (2005) use a slightly different approach than Gropp, Vesala 
and Vulpes (2005). They define different indicators based on equity prices in complement to 
more traditional financial information but they do not compute them in a monthly basis. 
Rather, they specify a model in which the information available at the 31
st December of each 
year is used to forecast any rating downgrade (not only the severe downgrades) in the 
following quarters. Besides, they control for opacity effects and Too-Big-To-Fail effects and 
they conclude that the market-based indicators are useful in some way. However, they argue 
that the predictive power of these variables depends on the extent to which the bank's debt is 
market traded, which is a quite intuitive result.  
4. The Dataset 
Our panel dataset contains several subsets of variables relative to 82 European 
commercial banks, including financial ratios, stock market indicators and credit ratings. All 
these variables are defined in a monthly basis
6 and are potentially available over the period 
1990-2005 but the global sample is unbalanced. We first describe the process of selection of 
the banks before we turn to the definition of all the variables we use in this study. 
4.1. Sample selection 
Our objective was to build a dataset similar to the one used in Gropp, Vesala and 
Vulpes (2005) for two primary reasons. First, we wanted to assess the quality of our database 
by running the same tests they did and by comparing our results. Second, we aimed at 
improving some aspects of their estimations. To do so, we used two different sources: 
Datastream for the stock prices and Bankscope for the financial ratios and the Fitch/ICBA 
credit ratings.  
We defined a series of monthly variables and we constructed a first sub-sample of 85 
banks on the basis of three criteria: (i) the commercial bank is a public company and the stock 
prices are available from the database Datastream, (ii) its total market capitalization exceeds 
100 €m by the end of 2005, and (iii) it is -or used to be- rated by the rating agency Fitch. In 
practice, this last criterion of credit rating availability is the most restrictive since we could 
get only 376 credit ratings over more than 5000 European commercial banks identified by 
Bankscope.  
Finally, we used a threshold for the turnover on equity to eliminate the companies 
whose stocks were not sufficiently traded over the period
7. This lead to the suppression of 3 
more banks and to the constitution of the database of 82 banks we used in this study. We give 
some descriptive statistics of this final sample in Appendix A. 
                                                 
6 Not all these variables are available in a monthly frequency but we completed the dataset so that a specific 
“bank-month” observation reflects the information available at this date. For instance, if a financial ratio was 
published on January and July of a same year, we assigned to the months February to June the value of the ratio 
in January, and for the months August to December we used the value of July. The same is true for the individual 
ratings from the rating agency Fitch since they can be modified at any date. 
7 The banks whose stock was traded less than 1000 times a day in 25% of the trading days (or less) were deleted 
from the sample.  An Early Warning Model for EU banks with Detection of the Adverse Selection Effect 
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We are aware of the well-known sample selection problem that may affect our dataset 
since public companies may well not be representative of the entire universe of the European 
commercial banks. The firms rated by Fitch may also be bigger in average than the other 
banks in this universe. In fact, this intuition is confirmed by the data since the 82 banks from 
our dataset have an average market capitalization (15 €bn by the end of 2005) and an average 
Total of Assets (150 €bn by the end of 2005) significantly higher than the average of the 5000 
banks available in Bankscope. Therefore, we shall underline the fact that our conclusions only 
apply to the biggest European commercial banks and the most actively traded on the stock 
market. 
4.2. Definition of the variables and global description of the sample 
Definition of the financial variables 
To construct CAMEL ratios and a measure of the adverse selection effect, we use 
accounting data from Bankscope from 1990 to 2004. When available, these financial ratios 
are defined on a quarterly basis and otherwise, on a biannually or annually basis. Table 1 
presents the financial ratio we use in our model and we describe the construction of these 
variables below. 
Table 1: Definition of our financial variables 
  Name of the variable  Variable definitions 
C Capfundtotassets  Capital funds / total assets 
A  Impairedloansgrossloans  Impaired loans / gross loans 
M Costtoincomeratio  Cost-to-income  ratio 
E  Returnonaverageequityroae  Return on average equity 





assetgrowththMAV126 Asset  growth 
Capital funds / total assets: As capital funds (equity + hybrid capital + subordinated 
debt) are a cushion against asset malfunction, this ratio measures the amount of protection 
afforded to the bank by the capital/subordinated investors. 
Impaired loans / gross loans: This ratio is a measure of the total loans that are doubtful. 
The denominator is the sum of loans and loan loss reserve. 
Cost-to-income ratio: It represents the overheads or costs of running the bank, the major 
element of which is salaries, as a percentage of income generated before provisions. 
Return on average equity is preferred to a classic return on equity to minimize the 
volatility of this performance indicator. The average equity is calculated on a period of two 
years. 
Liquid assets / total deposits and borrowings measures the percentage of borrowers and 
depositors funds could be met if there were a suddenly withdraw. Subordinated debt or hybrid 
capital is excluded from the denominator. An Early Warning Model for EU banks with Detection of the Adverse Selection Effect 
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Asset growth is a monthly year-on-year growth rate. In our model, we use a moving 
average calculated on twelve periods, between the asset growth in t–18 and t–6. We then 
specify this averaged asset growth variable with or without lag, depending on the horizon of 
the Model (see. Figure 2 in section 5.2). 
Definition of the credit ratings and the credit events 
We use the Individual Rating from the Fitch/ICBA database because it reflects the risks 
associated with the intrinsic activity of the bank, regardless of the financial profile of the 
holding it may be related to.  
This notation takes values ranging from A (the best rating) to E (the worst) and can be 
potentially revised at any moment. Finally, we also consider a Support Rating from the same 
agency describing the intensity of the safety net the bank might benefit from in case of 
financial difficulties. As we will see, this rating will help us to control for Too-Big-To-Fail 
effects. 
We created several dummy variables for five specific credit events, each one being 
equal to one at date t if the corresponding event realized during the month t.  
As usual, the variables Upgrade, Downgrade and No Change are equal to one if the 
Individual Rating is moved upward, downward or is confirmed by the rating agency. We also 
use two definitions for the so-called severe downgrades to identify the situations of financial 
fragility: the variable FragileC, equal to one whenever the rating falls to C or below and the 
variable FragileCD, equal to one if the rating falls to C/D or below
8. Gropp, Vesala and 
Vulpes (2005) provide convincing arguments to assess the quality of such a rating-based 
indicator of bank fragility. We argue that the latter specification of financial distress is the 
most adapted to our sample for two reasons. 
First, a detailed analysis of the series of ratings raises concerns about the homogeneity 
of the data. In particular, we argue that a couple of banks were given the rating C over some 
period of time, although they were not at all close to failure. One reason for this may be a 
change in the rating methodology used by Fitch
9. More generally, the more restrictive the 
criterion of "financial fragility", the smaller the risk of "Type II errors" (when the indicator 
signals a failure and no failure follows).  
Second, an event study conducted on the distance-to-default clearly shows that a 
threshold at rating C/D better discriminates between sound banks and fragile ones on the basis 
of this market indicator.  
                                                 
8 As Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2005) do, we drop the downgraded banks from the sample after the event. 
9 The rating agency reported for example that the definition of Support Rating has been changed in July 2003. An Early Warning Model for EU banks with Detection of the Adverse Selection Effect 
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Figure 1: Evolution of the DD indicator before a credit event 
Event study of the credit events






-18 -17 -16 -15 -14 -13 -12 -11 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Event Window (months)
DD Upgrades No Change Severe downgrade (below C) Severe downgrade (below C/D)
 
Construction of the “distance-to-default” indicator 
To compute the distance-to-default indicator on a monthly basis, we need the following 
inputs: the total market capitalization, the level and maturity of the debt, the volatility of stock 
prices. 
The market capitalization (€m) is extracted from Datastream. The definition of the debt 
we use is the KMV standard given by the sum of the short-term debt and the half of the long-
term debt. Finally, the historical volatility of the stock at the date t is defined as the moving 
average of the daily returns on the stock. The only parameter of choice is the width of the 
moving average window, traditionally ranging from 1 to 12 months. We show in Appendix C 
how the width of this window influences the evolution of the volatility and the DD. We also 
tried alternative specifications of the debt (Total Debt, interpolated or not), but this had no 
significant effect on the values of the DD. 
We finally chose to fix the window width to 6 months, as Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes 
(2005) did, to arbitrage between volatility smoothing and the quickness of reaction of the final 
indicator. We do not interpolate the value of the debt to avoid any inappropriate specification 
problem raised by Distinguin, Rous and Tarazi (2005), when the DD indicator uses future 
information (the future value of the debt) as an input to predict current rating changes. 
5. The results 
5.1. Testing the robustness of our distance-to-default as an 
indicator of bank fragility 
In this first section we implement several tests designed to assess the predictive power 
of our distance-to-default indicator. These tests are conducted using a methodology which has 
already been used by Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes
10 (2005). The reason of this methodological 
                                                 
10 GVV in the sequel. An Early Warning Model for EU banks with Detection of the Adverse Selection Effect 
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choice is that we use a sample of EU banks which is very similar to their own sample, but on 
a more extensive period: 1991-2005 while they used 1991-2001. As a consequence, it is 
interesting to check whether their results are still valid when more recent observations are 
included in the panel.  
Furthermore, these tests will provide a useful first-step assessment of our specific 
distance-to-default indicator. If it proves to be robust, we will be able in a second step to use it 
in our Early Warning Model of bank failures including a detection variable of the adverse 
selection effect. On the contrary, if we obtain a low and unstable predictive power of our 
distance-to-default indicator, this would raise some concerns about using it in any Early 
Warning Model of EU banks
11.  
We estimate a standard (pooled) logit model of the form :  
Pr(Fragile = 1) = F(β0 + β1ddRx + β2dddsuppRx) 
Where F(.) is the cumulative logistic distribution and ddRx is the x-months lagged 
distance-to-default indicator. dddsuppRx = ddRx × dsuppRx is an interacting term designed to 
test whether the predictive performance of the distance-to-default indicator is affected by the 
existence of a strong public support (safety net) to the bank. 
As in GVV (2005), the model is estimated for different lags of the independent 
variables separately, because it allows us to identify at which horizon the predictive power of 
the distance-to-default indicator is the best. Since we use panel data and pooled estimations, 
observations are not independent within banks -which can generate autocorrelation- and they 
are independent across banks -which can produce heteroskedasticity. As a consequence, the 
standard errors are adjusted using the Hubber/White/Sandwich method.  
Table 2 beneath reports the estimations of the model with the independent variables 
lagged 1, 3, 6, 9, 12 and 18 months behind.  
As expected, the coefficient of the distance-to-default is negative, and it is significant 
from the 1-month lead up to the 12-month lead. These results therefore slightly differ from 
GVV(2005) since their coefficient for the 3-month lead was not significant while their 18-
month lead coefficient was significant. We also see that, close to the downgrading event, the 
significance of the distance-to-default coefficient becomes weaker. This outcome was already 
underlined by GVV (2005), which interpreted it as a result of a decrease in banks’ equity 
volatility close to the default point.  
The coefficient of the interacting term dddsuppRx is never significant. This tends to 
prove that the safety net does not reduce the predictive power of our distance-to-default 
indicator.  
                                                 
11 But this could also indicate a deterioration of the predictive power of this kind of indicator in Europe since 
2001, and not necessary a failure of our specific distance-to-default indicator. An Early Warning Model for EU banks with Detection of the Adverse Selection Effect 
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Table 2: Predictive performance of the distance-to-defaut indicator: 
Pooled logit estimations, all banks 
 
Model 1 : one month 
in advance 
FragileCD  Model 2 : three 
months in advance 
FragileCD 
ddR1  -0.53 (0.28)*  ddR3  -0.58 (0.29)** 
dddsuppR1  -0.20 (0.17)  DddsuppR3  -0.18 (0.18) 
Constant  -3.88 (0.84)***  Constant  -3.74 (0.87)*** 
Observations 6874  Observations  6792 
LR test  10.46***  LR test  11.16*** 
Log likelihood  -82.97  Log likelihood  -82.47 
 
Model 3 : six 
months in advance 
FragileCD  Model 4 : nine 
months in advance 
FragileCD 
ddR6  -0.65 (0.24)***  ddR9  -0.56 (0.17)*** 
dddsuppR6  -0.17 (0.19)  DddsuppR9  -0.03 (0.19) 
Constant  -3.54 (0.70)***  Constant  -4.18 (0.52)*** 
Observations 6567  Observations  6344 
LR test  12.13***  LR test  7.35** 
Log likelihood  -81.58  Log likelihood  -77.25 
 
Model 5 : twelve 
months in advance 
FragileCD  Model 6 : eighteen 
months in advance 
FragileCD 
ddR12  -0.58 (0.22)***  ddR18  -0.32 (0.38) 
dddsuppR12  0.09 (0.22)  DddsuppR18  0.10 (0.24) 
Constant  -4.47 (0.56)***  Constant  -5.47 (0.84)*** 
Observations 6124  Observations  5697 
LR test  5.78*  LR test  1.94 
Log likelihood  -71.28  Log likelihood  -66.08 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
These first series of result establish the accuracy of our distance-to-default indicator but 
the robustness of its predictive performance remains to be confirmed. In particular, it is 
necessary to check whether it provides some supplementary information in comparison to the 
Fitch individual rating considered at the same time-lead. We thus implement the same 
estimations controlling for the Fitch individual rating observed at the time the distance-to-
default is also observed. Results of this test are given in Table 3 below. 
The distance-to-default indicator is slightly less significant after the introduction of the 
lagged ratings, especially close to the ‘failure’ event. However it remains fairly powerful nine 
and twelve months before the event. As a consequence we can conclude that the market 
information conveyed in the distance-to-default is not redundant with the information content 
of the ratings. Furthermore, it is updated at a much higher frequency than any sort of ratings 
so that, even if it is less significant than the lagged ratings in these estimations, we can 
conclude that it is useful in an Early Warning Model of bank fragility.  An Early Warning Model for EU banks with Detection of the Adverse Selection Effect 
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Table 3: Predictive performance of the distance-to-defaut indicator: 
Pooled logit estimations, controlling for the Fitch-IBCA individual rating before the event 
 
Model 1 : one month 
in advance 
FragileCD  Model 2 : three 
months in advance 
FragileCD 
ddR1  -0.32 (0.26)  ddR3  -0.37 (0.27) 
dddsuppR1  -0.03 (0.16)  dddsuppR3  -0.03 (0.18) 
ratingorderedR1  -2.17 (0.21)*** ratingorderedR3  -1.77 (0.20)*** 
Constant  6.96 (1.37)***  Constant  5.01 (1.38)*** 
Observations 6438  Observations  6364 
LR test  25.51***  LR test  23.23*** 
Log likelihood  -48.76  Log likelihood  -49.81 
 
Model 3 : six 
months in advance 
FragileCD  Model 4 : nine 
months in advance 
FragileCD 
ddR6  -0.52 (0.29)*  ddR9  -0.53 (0.20)*** 
dddsuppR6  -0.03 (0.20)  dddsuppR9  0.07 (0.21) 
ratingorderedR6  -1.55 (0.20)*** ratingorderedR9  -1.27 (0.18)*** 
Constant  4.30 (1.48)***  Constant  2.62 (1.30)** 
Observations 6154  Observations  5944 
LR test  22.86***  LR test  18.41*** 
Log likelihood  -49.73  Log likelihood  -51.67 
 
Model 5 : twelve 
months in advance 
FragileCD  Model 6 : eighteen 
months in advance 
FragileCD 
ddR12  -0.43 (0.18)**  ddR18  -0.16 (0.26) 
dddsuppR12  0.09 (0.20)  dddsuppR18  0.12 (0.20) 
ratingorderedR12  -1.04 (0.16)*** ratingorderedR18  -0.78 (0.18)*** 
Constant  0.98 (1.07)  Constant  -1.62 (0.99)* 
Observations 5734  Observations  5325 
LR test  13.81  LR test  6.72* 
Log likelihood  -53.69  Log likelihood  -50.08 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
It remains to be checked now whether our distance-to-default indicator preserves its 
predictive power when usual CAMEL variables are introduced in the model
12. This question 
is important because such a broad range of balance-sheet and income-statement ratios might 
eventually synthesize the most important part of the determinants of banks’ probability of 
default. Besides, since these indicators are available to market investors when they price 
banks’ stocks, there is a risk of redundancy of the information provided by the distance-to-
default. We already argued that, even if it was the case, the distance-to-default indicator 
would still be useful in an Early Warning Model because it can be very frequently updated.  
                                                 
12 Our database did not allow us to introduce any reliable indicator describing sensitivity to market risks. 
Consequently, we had to drop the “S” of CAMELS and focus only on Capital, Asset quality, Management, 
Earnings and Liquidity. An Early Warning Model for EU banks with Detection of the Adverse Selection Effect 
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But it must be acknowledged that this high frequency availability has also its drawback: 
volatility of the distance-to-default might bring some excessive noise in the estimation of 
defaults’ probability, conducting the EWS to overreact in some circumstances of high market 
volatility. Consequently, it would be reassuring if we could include both distance-to-default 
and CAMEL variables in our Early Warning Model. 
Table 4 presents the results of our pooled Logit estimations augmented with five 
CAMEL variables, in the case of a twelve months advance before the failure event.  
 
Table 4: Compared predictive performance of the distance-to-default indicator and CAMEL 












































Observations  6124 5622 4223 
Log likelihood   -71.28  -59.00  -30.76 
LR test  5.78*  15.85***  15.87** 
Pseudo R
2  0.04 0.12 0.21 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Before commenting these results, it is necessary to recall that, in our database, balance-
sheet and income-statement indicators are available either on an annual, biannual or quarterly 
basis
13 while the distance-to-default was computed at a monthly frequency. There are three 
different possible methods to deal with this problem. The first one would consist in 
interpolating the financial data to a monthly frequency and it would have two main 
advantages: firstly it would permit to keep a greater number of observations; secondly it 
                                                 
13 At the beginning of the sample (1991), accounting data is at a yearly frequency but many banks adopted a 
quarterly frequency for the publication of their financial statements during the second part of the nineties. An Early Warning Model for EU banks with Detection of the Adverse Selection Effect 
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would authorize to use the quarterly or biannual financial information when it is available. 
Nevertheless, as it is pointed out by Distinguin, Rous and Tarazi (2005), interpolations imply 
in some cases that future financial information is used to predict current rating changes. In the 
case of yearly accounting data for example, this problem will disappear only when the 
financial ratios are introduced with at list a twelve month lag.  
A second way to tackle the problem is to switch all the data at a yearly frequency. It 
avoids the drawback of interpolations but it conducts to loose valuable information : the 
sample size is a lot reduced; biannual or quarterly accounting information is ignored; and, 
most importantly, arbitrary choices must be done concerning the identification of ‘failures’ 
when several rating changes occur within an accounting year
14. Moreover, the downgrades 
occurring close to the end of the accounting year will tend to be artificially related to 
excessively good accounting statements produced at the beginning of the year, while end-of-
the-year quarterly statements might have revealed the deterioration. As a consequence, this 
latter methodology could produce underestimation of the predictive power of financial 
accountings (and consequently overestimation of the significance of higher-frequency market 
data).  
These caveats lead us to choose another methodology : we keep a monthly frequency 
for all the data, which means that accounting ratios are duplicated from one month to another 
until a new financial statement is published which happens every 12, 6 or 4 months in the 
Bankscope data.  The main problem with this methodological choice is that it might generate 
some supplementary autocorrelation but it is corrected in our estimations where we use robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering between banks.  
The results in Table 4 show that the distance-to-default conveys some specific 
information which complements the information provided by CAMEL financial ratios. The 
distance-to-default remains significant when it is combined with the CAMEL ratios and the 
Pseudo-R
2 is neatly higher in the full model when compared with the model with only the 
accounting variables. Contrary to what is usually obtained in the studies of US banks, capital-
related ratios do not seem to predict the failure of EU banks and the financial variables which 
have significant power are mainly related to earnings, asset quality and, interestingly, 
management efficiency. These results are not surprising concerning EU banks since they 
conform themselves to the Basel II regulatory framework and have in consequence rather 
homogenous capital ratios. 
5.2. Introducing an adverse-selection indicator 
  Now that we have obtained an Early Warning Model of EU banks which behaves 
similarly to EU-focused models found in previous literature, we can implement a test 
designed to assess the existence of a possible adverse-selection effect for banks which have 
undertaken aggressive growth strategies. As suggested by King, Nuxoll and Yeager (2005), 
several competing indicators of such strategies have been tried: asset growth, variation of the 
capital ratio, loans growth, deposits growth, etc.  
  We found that the most significant and strong effect is produced by an averaged 
measure of past asset growth. Table 5 below presents the results of estimations conducted 
                                                 
14 As an example, Distinguin, Rous and Tarazi (2005) ignore the downgrades when they follow an upgrade in the 
same year or when they are followed by an upgrade in the same year. This leaves them enough downgrade 
events to run robust estimations but this would not leave us enough severe downgrades (failure) events. An Early Warning Model for EU banks with Detection of the Adverse Selection Effect 
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with a prediction horizon of 3, 6, 9, 12, 18 and 24 months. In each of these models, the failure 
probability is explained by CAMEL ratios and the distance-to-default which are lagged of 
respectively 3, 6, 9, 12, 18 and 24 months. We also introduce the averaged asset growth 
which is computed on a range of twelve months ending respectively 6, 9, 12, 18 and 24 
months before the failure event in models (1) and (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6).  
  The construction of the independent variables in relation to the horizon of the different 
models is summarized in Figure 2 below. 
Figure 2: horizon of the different Early Warning Models 
 
 
Computation of  the CAMEL  














The adverse selection variable is thus defined as follows :  
AssetgrowthMAV126 = average of the rates of growth of asset from t – 18 to t – 6  
AssetgrowthMAV126R3 = AssetgrowthMAV126 lagged of 3 months 
AssetgrowthMAV126R6 = AssetgrowthMAV126 lagged of 6 months 
AssetgrowthMAV126R12 = AssetgrowthMAV126 lagged of 12 months 
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Failure event
Model (1) Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
t-9
t-3
Model (3) :a s s e t growthMAV126R3
Model (4) :a s s e t growthMAV126R6
Model (5) : assetgrowthMAV126R12




Models (1) and (2) :A s s e t growthMAV126 
 
  The results in Table 5 show that the introduction of the adverse selection indicator 
produces interesting outcomes at every horizon. Past asset growth has a strong and very 
significant positive impact on banks’ default probability, even at the 24 months horizon. 
Furthermore, since CAMEL and distance-to-default variables are still significant, we see that 
the introduction of this adverse-selection variable is not at all redundant with any of the other 
predictors already used.  
  If we compare, as an example, the previous twelve-months-behind horizon model 
(Table 4) with the results obtained at the same horizon in model (4) of Table 5, we can see 
that the econometric specification is clearly improved by the introduction of the adverse 
selection effect (assetgrowthMAV126R6): now all the CAMEL variables are significant 
except the capital-related one; the distance-to-default is still significant; and the Pseudo-R
2 
rises from 0.21 to 0.28.  
  As a consequence we can draw a conclusion which is in accordance with theoretical 
predictions: when banks undertake aggressive (and risky) strategies leading to a faster-than-An Early Warning Model for EU banks with Detection of the Adverse Selection Effect 
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average growth of their assets, they tend to have a higher probability of failure in the sequel. 
As long as it is the asset growth variable which is found to have the highest predictive power, 
we can add that this phenomenon of adverse selection is not limited to the selection of loans: 
it probably also affects other kinds of assets that banks acquire to satisfy their growth appetite. 
Table 5 - Full Early Warning Model including the adverse selection effect,distance-to-default 
and CAMEL variables:pooled-logit estimations, all banks 
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assetgrowthMAV126R3     4.21 
(1.09)***
   
assetgrowthMAV126R6       5.56 
(1.56)*** 
  
assetgrowthMAV126R12       4.27 
(0.93)***
 
















Observations  4563 4627 4623 4623 4332 4011 
Log  likelihood  -34.20 -32.47 -34.13 -28.38 -31.95 -24.58 
LR  test  49.13*** 39.97*** 23.50*** 21.53***  13.73*  14.12** 
Pseudo R
2  0.42 0.38 0.26 0.28 0.18 0.22 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
1 Lagged 3 months in model (1), 6 months in model (2), …, 24 months in model (6) An Early Warning Model for EU banks with Detection of the Adverse Selection Effect 
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6. Conclusion 
First of all, our empirical results confirm the robustness of distance-to-default as an 
early indicator of banks’ failure. Indeed, our results are similar to those already obtained by 
Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes even thought we used a longer dataset including more recent 
failure events. Moreover, we used a more restrictive definition of the “failure” event and it 
didn’t decrease the predictive power of the distance-to-default. This indicator remains 
significant in the Early Warning Model even when it is joined with a full set of CAMEL 
accounting indicators; and its predictive power is still maintained after the introduction of a 
control variable accounting for the “Too-Big-To-Fail” effect.  
More importantly, the second part of our empirical study shows that the introduction of a 
measure of the adverse selection effect clearly improves the early warning model. Averaged 
past asset growth has a strong and very significant positive impact on banks’ future 
probability of default, even at the 24 months horizon. Furthermore, since CAMEL and 
distance-to-default variables are still significant after its introduction, we can argue that this 
new variable is a useful complement providing valuable supplementary information next to 
the traditional predictors.  
This last conclusion is in accordance with the theories of banks behaviour in an 
asymmetric information environment: when banks undertake aggressive strategies 
characterized by a faster-than-average growth of their assets, they tend to adopt less selective 
standards in the selection of their assets. We have shown that this tends to rise their 
probability of failure, at list in the EU banks. We have argued that this phenomenon seems to 
affect not only the selection of loans but also other kinds of assets. 
These results suggest that the introduction of new, risk-focused and growth-focused, 
variables may be a relevant track for future developments of Early Warning Models. There 
are still several research issues to be explored in this spirit. In particular, the lack of 
availability of detailed data has slowed down the building of good interest rate-risk measures. 
Another very interesting research topic in this field would be to build and introduce some 
indicators of a bank’s sensitivity to contagion effects and systemic risks.  An Early Warning Model for EU banks with Detection of the Adverse Selection Effect 
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Appendix A: Descriptive statistics of the sample 





























Bank Holding & Holding Company 10
Savings Bank 6
Cooperative Bank 5
Investment Bank/Securities House 3
Real Estate / Mortgage Bank 2
Medium & Long Term Credit Bank 1
Total 82
 





Severe Downgrades below C/D 20




Total of events 267  
 
 
•  Evolution of the average Distance-to-Default : 





















Average DD Number of observations
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Appendix B : Merton's structural model of credit risk (1974) 
We follow Merton's approach ("On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure 
of Interest Rates", 1974) by using an option-based structural model of credit risk. In this 
framework, the firm goes bankruptcy whenever the value of its assets falls below the face 
value of its debt at maturity. A measure of the creditworthiness of the firms is then given by 
the distance-to-default indicator, which represents the number of standard deviations 
(measured in terms of the assets' volatility) that separate the firm from its default point 
(defined by Total Assets = Total Debt). The smaller the distance-to-default, the higher the 
default risk. 
However, the value of the firm's assets, as well as their volatility, are not observable. 
Since we have access to the price of equity, we can use the option-pricing formula derived by 
Black and Scholes (1973) to calculate these unknown values. Indeed, Merton (1974) shows 
that a firm’s equity value is equivalent to an European call option on the asset value of the 


















As usual, we assume that the asset value of the firm, VA, follows a Geometric Brownian 
Motion with drift equal to the risk-free rate, r, and volatility σA . The value of equity as an 
option on the firm's assets, as well as its volatility, are given by two formulae derived from 
the standard option pricing approach and depends on VA, σA, r, D and T, the time to maturity. 
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Where N(d) is the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal distribution 












=    and    d2 = d1- σA √T 
Reverse-engineering these two equations yields the asset value and the asset volatility. 
Finally, the distance-to-default is given by : 
A
A D V DD
σ
− =  
                                                 
15 The risk neutral framework simplifies calculations since we do not need to estimate the drift of the asset value. 
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Appendix C: Definition of the historical volatility of stock prices 
And impact on the distance-to-default indicator 
The historical volatility of stocks used as an input in the calculation of the DD indicator is 
usually defined as the moving average of total daily returns (including dividends) with a 
window width of 1 to 12 months. The smaller the window, the more reactive is the volatility 
and thus the DD, as we can see it on two examples. 
Historical volatility of the stock Barclays 
(Source : Datastream) 
Historical volatility of the stock Standard Chartered 
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  We also observed that the definition of the volatility had an influence on the value of 
the DD, in contrast to other inputs of this indicator. We calculated the values of the DD over 
the period 1995-2005 with 8 different specifications. While the maturity of the debt was fixed 
to one year, we allowed the definition of the volatility and the level of the debt to vary
17. The 
crucial parameter is clearly the length of the window used in the calculation of the volatility, 
but the values of the assets in Merton’s model are also influenced by the specification of the 
debt. In particular, the fact to interpolate or not the values of the debt within a specific year 
has no influence on the values of the DD. 
                                                 
17 The moving average of the daily returns was calculated with a window of 3 and 6 months, whereas the debt 
was defined as the total liabilities and alternatively with the KMV definition. We then interpolate the values of 
the debt for each specification to obtain 4 definitions of the debt-to-equity ratio. An Early Warning Model for EU banks with Detection of the Adverse Selection Effect 
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  The same kind of pattern was observed for each one of the 82 banks in our sample. 
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